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Abstract
Employment of software agents for conducting negotiations with online customers promises to increase the flexibility and reach of the exchange mechanism and reduce
transaction costs. Past research had suggested different
negotiation tactics for the agents, and had used them in experimental settings against human negotiators. This work
explores the interaction between negotiation strategies and
the complexity of the negotiation task as represented by the
number of negotiation issues. Including more issues in a
negotiation potentially allows the parties more space to
maneuver and, thus, promises higher likelihood of agreement. In practice, the consideration of more is-sues requires higher cognitive effort, which could have a negative
effect on reaching an agreement. The results of human–
agent negotiation experiments conducted at a major Canadian university revealed that there is an interaction between chosen strategy and task complexity. Also, when
competitive strategy was employed, the agents' utility was
the highest. Because competitive strategy resulted in fewer
agreements the average utility per agent was the highest in
the compromising–competitive strategy.
Keywords: human-agent negotiations, software agents,
strategies, concessions, multi-attribute utility, experiments,
task complexity

1. Introduction
Negotiations can be conducted online by using e-negotiation systems. E-negotiation systems can facilitate the communication of participating parties and offer a variety of
decision aids [1]. These systems can flexibly organize negotiations in certain relational structures and sequential
processes of exchange. They can impose the format of the
exchanged offers and provide analytical support for negotiators in different phases. These features make e-negotiation systems different from general communication tools,
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such as e-mail and Internet messengers. Typically, these
systems provide support to their users by helping them capture and model their objectives, preferences, reservation
levels, and other important aspects. While the system features can smooth negotiation processes and reduce negotiators’ efforts, the negotiators are still responsible for the
negotiation outcomes, as they need to engage in repetitive
decision-making, interact with other negotiators, assess incoming offers, and construct counter-offers.
Autonomous software agents become increasingly popular in e-commerce. They participate in a variety of commercial activities [2] [3]. Designing and offering software
agents that are capable of conducting negotiations has been
a persistent interest of the software-agent research community [4]. When software agents are employed to conduct
commerce negotiations, technology takes an active role of
determining social affairs.
A distinguishing feature of negotiation is that negotiators need to resolve mutual dependencies. Negotiation
agreements depend on the other negotiators’ choices. Thus,
conducting fully automated negotiations for business transactions is tricky, as the resulting commitment when an
agreement is achieved may not be desirable to the principal
businesses or individuals.
On the other hand, employment of agents in negotiations
can be beneficial due to the fact that software agents have
computational advantages as compared to human negotiators. Software agents can operate faster and potentially optimize the outcome given the information available to
them. They do not get distracted, which is very different
from humans whose decisions are influenced by their selective attention. In addition, agent behavior is less biased
and more consistent than that of humans [5]. When an
agent receives a negotiation task specified in terms of negotiation issues, preferences, reservation levels, and the
concession-making strategies, it will negotiate precisely in
accordance with these specifications.
Employing software agents to negotiate with others can
have additional benefits. For instance, agents can reduce
negotiation-related efforts, help people with limited negotiation skills [6], save time with lower opportunity costs,
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alleviate negative effects, and achieve more efficient settlements [7]. The design of software agents that are capable
of negotiating has been focusing primarily on engineering
aspects. Empirical studies of how agents perform when negotiating with human negotiators remain rare.
This work investigates the performance of agent-to-human negotiations when tactics adopted by agents and task
complexity vary. The work attempts to explore the prospects of employing software agents to conduct real business transactions. An experiment was conducted by manipulating agent negotiation style and negotiation-task complexity.
An electronic negotiation system, which enables the creation of negotiation cases, setting up multiple negotiation
issues and preference structures, defining negotiation tactics for agents, as well as other functions was built for the
experiment. Software agents and human negotiators were
paired in negotiation dyads, which then negotiated on an
either simple or complex business case. The results reveal
that agent-negotiation tactics and task complexity have an
interaction effect. Specifically, agents that used a competitive tactic reached more agreements in the simple case than
in the complex case. A similar effect was absent when
agents adopt a compromising tactic.
The paper builds on and extends the work presented in
[8]. It has five more sections. Prior work on the design of
and experiments with software agents is discussed in Section 2. Negotiation strategies are introduced in Section 2.
Concessions are one of the key component of strategy. The
design of the concession schedules that agents can employ
is also discussed in this section. The agent-human negotiation experiment is discussed in Section 4 and it is followed
by the presentation of the experiment results. Conclusions
and future work complete the paper.

2. Background
One of the first experiments involving agent negotiations
involved Kasbah marketplace [9, 10]. In these experiments
users created simple agents that were dispatched to meet
and negotiate with each other on price only for items. The
agents incorporated three types of negotiation concession
tactics. These tactics are used to decide what kind of offer
to make at a given point in the negotiation process.
Faratin, Sierra and Jennings [11], in an influential study
that build on the Kasbah experiments, proposed formal representation of the agent negotiation strategies of which
concession tactics were a key component. The choice of
concession tactic based on the negotiation history and context, deadline and other variables. This allowed the agent
to employ different tactics within a single strategy.
Three categories of tactics have been identified: behavior-dependent, time-dependent, and resource-dependent.
The behavior-dependent tactics make their choice of offer
based on the moves made by the parties. An example includes tit-for-tat tactics that advocate that the concession to
be made by a party should be proportional, or symmetrical

to the one made by the counterpart.
The second family of tactics model concession-making
as a function of time elapsed between the beginning of negotiation and the estimated ending point. Curves showing
small concessions in the beginning corresponded to
tougher competitive behavior, while those making large
concessions and quickly approaching the vicinity of reservation levels related to compromising behavior. Resourcedependent tactics adjusted concession levels based on the
scarcity of the resources involved.
Regarding agent involvement in electronic negotiations,
three categories can be mentioned: (1) human-to-human
negotiations with agent support; (2) agent-to-agent negotiations featuring full automation on both sides of a table,
and (3) human-to-agent negotiations, where a software
agent is paired up with a human counterpart [7].
The first category includes use of agents as advisors for
helping human negotiators cope with the complexity of negotiations involving multiple issues, and staying in line
with their defined preference structures and concessionmaking plans. Work on Aspire agents [12] and eAgora
marketplaces [13] are examples of the first category work.
For instance, experiments with agent-supported negotiations revealed that human negotiators using agents as advisors performed better in complex (multi-issues) tasks than
unassisted human negotiators [14].
Work in the second category, i.e., agent-to-agent negotiations, has been extensive and includes distributed AI,
multi-agent systems and learning [see, e.g., 4, 15-18]. The
current work falls into the third category in which both human and agents negotiated.
Early studies on human-agent negotiations deals with
providing the agents with negotiation capabilities [19, 20].
Klein, Woods, et al. [21] discuss ten challenges for making
software agents capable of participating in joint humanagent activities.
Major challenges of designing agents that can negotiated
with humans include bounded rationality and incomplete
information. Yang and Singhal [6] formulated guidelines
for agent-designers have been proposed: randomization (to
prevent manipulation of an agent by an opponent), having
a concession strategy, and maintaining a database of past
interactions (for modeling the opponents).
Chavez et al. [7] suggested several tactics that agents
could employ in negotiations with humans. The suggested
tactics were: making a tough initial offer; making two or
more simultaneous equivalent (to an agent) offers; making
monotonously decreasing concessions (as suggested by
Raiffa [22] to signal “approaching the limit”); making large
concessions in the final offer; and using strategic delays.
Few experimental studies involving humans and agents
in exchange settings focusing on objective as well as subjective aspects of negotiations have been reported. An early
experimental study matching humans with agent counterparts involved AutONA agents [23]. The agents negotiated
on price and volume while following the so-called alphabeta tactics. The agents did not significantly outperform
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humans.
An agent representing a salesperson that employed persuasion and negotiation techniques while interacting with
a customer is described in [24]. Persuasion involved customer – agent dialogue with the use of pre-defined arguments organized into a tree. Price was the single negotiated
issue. The findings suggested that persuasion increased
buyers’ product valuation and willingness to pay, and negotiation increased the seller’s surplus.
De Melo, Celso and Gratch [25] examined effects of
agents’ expression of emotions on the negotiator’s concession behavior. In this study, human subjects were paired up
with agents that expressed anger, neutrality, or happiness
during negotiations. For that purpose, the agents used both
with verbal and non-verbal expression mode. The subjects
were aware that they were negotiating with machines. As
expected, “angry” agents were able to gain more concessions from the human opponents than the “happy” ones.
In [26], the authors investigated effects of using various
agent negotiation tactics in experiments with human subjects. In these bilateral negotiation experiments involving
the sale of a computer five different concession-making
styles were used: competitive, linear, compromising, competitive-then-compromising, and tit-for-tat. Agents were
on the seller side, while humans were on the buyer side. A
control group was included on the seller side, including human subjects. The results revealed that most agent types
outperformed human “colleagues” in terms of utility of the
achieved agreement and the agreement rate. Competitive
agents achieved the highest utility levels, while compromising agents had the highest number of agreements.
Vahidov, Kersten and Gimon [27], agents were employed in multi-bilateral negotiation settings. Here, the
case featured a procurement scenario with a single buyer
and three sellers. The buyer would award a single contract
to one of the sellers based on simultaneous negotiations
with all three counterparts. While most of the participants
were human subjects, agents were present in some of the
seller groups. The results showed that compromising
agents achieved higher agreement rates than humans, while
competitive ones failed to win any contract.

3. Negotiations strategies, tactics, and tasks
In the current work, we set out to investigate the performance of agents not only based on the agent strategies, but
also on the complexity of the negotiation task. The complexity is manipulated by varying the number of issues involved in the negotiation process.
3.1 Negotiation strategies and tactics
Scholars in negotiations as well as military and political
sciences distinguish between strategies and tactics [28].
Strategies are relatively stable and are associated with the

negotiator’s attitude to conflict situations, negotiation context, skills and the importance of the conflict and its resolution, Negotiator’s skills include the toolbox of methods
for conflict assessment and its resolution. A tactic is the
combination of concrete methods that are selected at any
specific time of the negotiation process; they are contextand time-dependent [29].
In some situations, participants may employ a single tactic which is equivalent to a strategy. This is the case with
software agents that employ a concession formula irrespectively of the changes in the negotiation context. When the
agents use context-dependent messages, alter their concession patterns, or change their frequency of offers and/or
messages, then they are likely to employ different tactics
within a single strategy.
There are five well-known types of approaches to conflict [18], [30], three of which can be used to define negotiation strategies’ types, i.e., competitive, compromising
and collaborating. Collaborating strategies require that the
negotiators make an effort in exchanging truthful information, including their preferences and trade-offs. This effort as well as the negotiators’ unwillingness to provide
their counterparts with truthful relevant information [31,
32] led us to focus on competitive and compromising strategies.
In addition to the two pure strategies we have also implemented two mixed strategies. The mixed strategies describe situations in which the negotiators at some point
switch from their competitive (compromising) tactics and
employ compromising (competitive) tactics.
3.2 Task complexity
Task complexity broadly refers to the effort required to
perform the task [33] and it can be assessed based on three
aspects: (1) syntactic difficulty; (2) cognitive complexity;
and (3) communicative stress [34]. We are concerned here
with the cognitive complexity measured against the number of the negotiation issues. A meta-analysis of the taskperformance relationship shows that increased complexity
is negatively correlated with performance [35].
Increased complexity causes the negotiators to consider
only a small subset of offers, which is likely to lead to poor
agreements [36]. It also significantly contributes to a more
frequent use of competitive tactics over compromising and
collaborative tactics [37].
High cognitive task complexity, e.g., having a large
number of issues that are preferentially interdependent, requires that the negotiators extend more effort and focus on
the task. This may lead to a decrease of effort on the process and its progress. One approach to reduce complexity
is to engage in issue-by-issue negotiations which is cognitively simpler but prone to abuse by the counterpart and
may lead to inferior agreements [38, 39].
Decision and negotiation aids, including tools used for
preference elicitation and utility function construction,
help the negotiators to engage in negotiations, where they
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simultaneously consider multiple issues. This is the case in
our experiments: both the agents and the human participants exchange offers that comprise values for all issues.
The focus here is on the agents’ performance and the
quality of the agreements they achieve. Following earlier
studies, we analyze the relationship between the task complexity and the agreement quality (measured with utility).
In addition, we compare the efficacy of negotiation strategies for different tasks.

4. Negotiation experiment

4.2 Strategies and concessions
We have chosen four strategies for the agents: competitive,
compromising, competitive-then-compromising, and compromising-then-competitive.
Each strategy was defined by two components: (1) a
strategy configuration component; and (2) a concession
curve component.
The screen used for strategy configuration for the agent
is shown in Figure 2 and the concession curves are shown
in Figures 3 and 4.

Two negotiation cases used in the experiments and the
agents’ concession schedules are discussed below.
4.1 Negotiation case
Two types of cases were included:
1. Simple cases involved the following five issues: price,
regular air time, extra air time, text messaging, and
data. The buyers and sellers were given both different
and divergent preferences (weights) for these issues,
indicating their importance levels.
2. Complex cases involved ten issues: in addition to the
five issues of the simple case also call display,
voicemail, call waiting, conference call, and call forwarding.
Figure 1 shows the screenshot for the setup of a simple
case. The setup for the complex case was similar.
Figure 2. Strategy configuration
Strategy configuration included the following three
components: (1) the specification of the timing of the first
and subsequent offers; (2) the way the agent considered the
human negotiator’s offers in the computation of the counteroffer offers; and (3) the messages that the agent sent
(with or without offers) when the message condition was
met.
With each strategy, a time-dependent concession function was associated, they jointly represent the complete
strategy. The concession curve was modeled using Bezier
curves. The concession schedule associated with pure strategy was modeled with:
B(t) = (1−t)2 P0 + 2(1−t) t P1 + t2 P2;
Figure 1. Setup of the simple case
In order to calculate the total utility of the offer, the issues and the issue options were assigned weights. These
weights were used in an additive utility function to estimate
the level of attractiveness of an offer. Agents used this information in order to decide on the acceptability of the received offers and to generate offers.

and the concession schedule associated with mixed strategy was modeled with
B(t) = (1−t)3 P0 + 3(1−t)2 t P1 + 3(1−t) t2 P2 + t3 P3:
where t ∈ [0, 1], P1, P2, P3 and P4 are points used to define
the max, min and curvature of the curve (indicated as dots
in Figs. 3 and 4).
Competitive agents tend to make smaller concessions in
terms of the utility of generated offers in the beginning of

415

the negotiations. However, as they approach the negotiation deadline, they begin making larger concessions in
search of an agreement. These agents are expected to have
the highest utility of agreement levels, perhaps at the expense of the number of agreements.
Compromising agents tend to make large concessions in
the very beginning of the negotiation period in an attempt
to reach agreement quickly. This represents the case where
an agent is anxious to sell the plan. Compromising agents
are not expected to have high utility value deals, although
they are more likely to make an agreement.
Concessions schedules for the two pure strategies are
shown in Fig. 3.

4.3 Human participants
The subjects were recruited from university students enrolled in an online case. The case was chosen so that the
subjects had a good level of familiarity with it. The case
featured the sale of a mobile phone plan.
Prior to the negotiation, the case was outlined to the subjects, who could ask questions and request clarifications.
We found out that most subjects were well aware of the
issues involved in such plans and only a few required additional explanations.

Figure 4. Compromising-then-competitive and
competitive-then-compromising schedules
Figure 3. Competitive and compromising
schedules
The two remaining strategies comprise a mix of the
competitive and compromising schedules. Part of the
guidelines for agent tactics design were outlined in [7], as
mentioned in the background section suggested: making a
tough initial offer; making monotonously decreasing concessions; making large concession in the final offer.
The compromising-competitive schedule mimics this
sort of behavior. It starts with the tough offer, then makes
quick concessions. These become smaller with time to
make an opponent think that the agent is reaching its reservation level. If the counterpart does not propose a good offer for the agent, then the agent makes another small concession in an effort to reach an agreement.
The competitive-compromising strategy starts out tough
in the hopes of grabbing high-value deals. However, if an
agreement is not reached in the initial phases, the agent
switches to compromising mode. In this way, the agent
could combine the benefits of both competitive and competing tactics.
Concession schedules for the two mixed strategies are
shown in Fig. 4.

4.4 Experiment
The treatments included randomly pairing up the subjects
with various types of agents in a simple or complex case as
described above. The experiment was conducted on the
web, whereby subjects could perform their tasks from any
location in an asynchronous mode during a two-day period.
The subjects were invited to join the negotiations via
emails containing the link to the system. Human subjects
were free to terminate the negotiation at any time without
reaching an agreement.
All agents acted on the seller side and they were not
aware of the buyers’ preferences. The buyers’ and the
sellers’ preference weights were somewhat different in order to promote tradeoffs, which have been considered one
of the key activities necessary to reach an efficient agreement.
The preferences were specified and fixed for all human
users. This was done in order to control variation in the experiments.

5. Results
A total of 754 subjects have participated in the experiment
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and have completed the experimental task. For the analysis
of the results we have selected only those subjects who
made more than one offer to filter out the cases where subjects did not take the experimental case seriously. After filtering the number of subjects dropped to 368. Based on
these retained observations, 262 negotiations (71%) ended
up in an agreement, while 106 (29%) dyads did not make
an agreement.
5.1 Agreement rate
The agreement rate for the simple case setting was 75.5%,
while for the complex case it was 65.4%. Thus, in simple
case, including fewer issues, the agreements were more frequent. On one hand, a larger number of issues should give
negotiators more space for “maneuvering” in negotiations,
thus higher likelihood of making an agreement. On the
other hand, the complexity of the case taxes cognitive capabilities of the humans and requires more cognitive effort.
In our setup, one case included five issues, while the
other featured ten. This seems to be the reason why fewer
agreements were made in the complex case. Table 1 displays the agreement rates for the four tactics overall, and
for simple vs. complex cases separately.
Table 1. Agreement rates for different
agent types
Strategy
Simple case Complex case Overall
Competitive
57.1%
48.9%
53.6%
Compromising
87.7%
85.3%
87.0%
Compromising
83.8%
70.0%
75.9%
– Competitive
Competitive –
71.0%
60.0%
66.1%
Compromising
As one can see from the table, the highest agreement
rates were achieved by the compromising agents, and the
lowest one by the competitive agents. This is not surprising
given their concession schedules the other two agent types
are in between the extremes. However, compromisingcompetitive agents seem to have been able to make more
agreements than the competitive-compromising ones.
Thus, apparently the guidelines for agent design seem to be
having a positive impact in terms of the likelihood of an
agreement.
Case complexity does not seem to have a large effect on
the agreement rate for the compromising agents. This
makes sense, as the agent concedes so quickly that agreements are reached early regardless the complexity of the
case. It does seem to have a larger impact when an agent is
competitive. The implication here is that competitive
agents are more likely to make an agreement in simpler
cases. Interestingly, the biggest difference in terms of
agreement rate is for the compromising-competitive
agents. For simple cases their agreement rate approaches
the rates for the compromising agent.

5.2 Sellers’ strategy and agreement utility
Next, we analyze the agent performance in terms of the
seller utility of the achieved agreements. For this analysis
only the instances where the agreement was achieved were
included to enable calculation of the utilities. A general linear model was built incorporating agent types and the complexity level for predicting the obtained utilities. Number
of offers was included as a co-variate as it represented effort and time spent in the negotiation instances.
Multivariate tests showed that the case complexity,
agent type, and number of offers were all significant at p =
0.05 level. Furthermore, the interaction of case complexity
and agent type was also significant. Table 2 shows the results of utility calculations for different agent types.
Table 2. Sellers’ average agreement utility
for different concession schedules
Concession Simple case Complex case Overall
73.67
Competitive
81.42
61.55
46.74
Compromising
47.05
45.96
Compromising
54.16
49.86
51.88
– Competitive
Competitive –
53.26
46.33
50.45
Compromising
Average
57.02
50.87
54.62
The sellers achieved higher final utility in the simple
case setting than in the complex case setting (61.5 and 52.4
respectively).
Overall, competitive agents achieved agreements with
the highest utility, followed by the compromising-competitive, competitive-compromising, and lastly, compromising agents. Complexity of the case has the largest impact
for competitive agents, medium impact for the compromising-competitive and competitive-compromising agents,
and virtually no impact for the compromising agents.
5.3 Sellers’ utility
The competitive strategy may produce the highest agreement’s utility for individual agents but the agreements are
achieved in the smallest number of the negotiations; 57.1%
of the competitive agents achieved an agreement in the
simple case and 48.9% in the complex case (see Table 1).
From the perspective of a business that employs selling
agents the average utility per seller is more important criterion because it determines the total utility (profit). Table
3 shows the average utility of an agreement per one seller.
For the simple case, the average utility per one seller is
the highest for the competitive strategy followed by compromising–competitive strategy. For the complex case, interestingly, agents that employ the compromising strategy
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achieve the highest utility value, followed by agents employing the compromising–competitive strategy.
Table 3. Average utility per seller
Concession Simple case Complex case Overall
30.12
39.52
Competitive
46.52
40.60
Compromising
41.24
39.20
Compromising
45.38
34.90
39.36
– Competitive
Competitive –
37.80
27.80
33.34
Compromising
Average
42.73
33.01
38.21
Based on these results, we can say that a business that
does not distinguish between simple and complex negotiation cases should employ equipped selling agents with the
compromising strategy because on average it produces
higher utility than the agents that use competitive strategy.
The latter is very closely followed by compromising–competitive strategy that produces results. Overall, these three
strategies yielded much higher utility, compared to the
competitive-compromising strategy.
5.4 Buyers’ utility
This work focuses on the agent performance in two different settings and the implication of their use of different negotiation strategies on the agreement’s utility. In the case
of single-shot negotiations and when reputation has no impact on the negotiators’ behavior one-sided focus may be
sufficient. If, however sellers engage in repeated negotiations and/or reputation plays a role, then the results
achieved by the other-side are likely to play a role [40, 41].
Therefore, we briefly discuss here the results achieved by
the buyers. Table 4 shows the average buyers’ utility for
the agreements; this table corresponds to Table 2 for the
sellers.
Table 4. Buyers’ average agreement utility
for agent’s different concession schedules
Concession Simple case Complex case Overall
18.70
Competitive
8.57
12.52
39.96
Compromising
37.29
38.06
Compromising
30.39
19.01
24.35
– Competitive
Competitive 18.91
30.81
23.73
Compromising
Average
26.96
26.63
26.83
Table 4 shows that the buyers achieved significantly
lower utility values (all utility values were between 0 and
100). Particularly the difference for the competitive strategies is drastic: the sellers achieved 81.42 and 61.55 while

the buyers achieved 8.57 and 18.7 for the simple and complex cases, respectively. The competitive-compromising
strategy produced somewhat better results for the buyers
but the difference is quite large. In both case types and for
every strategy the sellers outperformed the buyers.
The buyers’ low utility of the agreements results in poor
results achieved by every buyer on average. The buyers’
utilities shown in Table 5 correspond to the sellers’ utilities
shown in Table 3.
Table 5. Average utility per buyer for
agents’ different concession schedules
Concession Simple case Complex case Overall
9.15
Competitive
4.90
6.72
34.09
Compromising
32.69
33.10
Compromising
25.46
13.31
18.48
– Competitive
Competitive 13.42
18.48
15.68
Compromising
Average
20.35
17.41
19.10
From the results shown in Table 3 it follows that a company that would employ all the buyers participating in this
experiment would obtain utility per buyer of 20.35 for the
simple case and 17.41 for the complex case. This can be
contrasted with a selling company that employed all the
agents: it would achieve utility 43.03 for the simple case
and 33.26 for the complex case. This means that the agents
achieved over twice as much as the human buyers.

6. Conclusions
The purpose of this work was to investigate the effects of
agent negotiation strategies and negotiation task complexity on agent performance in electronic negotiations. As suspected, the agents’ negotiation strategies have a significant
interaction with the task complexity. This difference is especially prominent for the competitive agents, as they
made significantly fewer agreements and achieved significantly lower agreement utilities in complex cases. Overall,
agents made 18% more agreements in negotiations involving fewer issues.
One limitation of the current research is that experiment
was done online rather than in the lab setting. This reduced
the potential control over the subject behavior in the experiments. Furthermore, the time span allocated for the experiment (two days) may have affected the results achieved by
the human buyers. Future in-lab experiments preceded with
a quiz that assess the participants’ understanding of the
case and the task should be undertaken to overcome these
limitations. We also plan to varying levels of complexity,
for example, by including a single issue, three issues, five
issues, and ten issues.
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Another limitation is that we consider one-shot negotiations. When the transactions between sellers and buyer repeat over time, then the sellers may employ strategies that
are likely to create a relationship with the buyers so that
they are more likely to engage in future negotiations. In situations when repeat sales are unlikely, this limitation may
be of lesser importance.
A related limitation is due to the lack of competition.
The buyers could not terminate their negotiations with one
seller and initiate change with another seller. One extension may be an experiment in which the buyers have more
flexibility and may negotiate with several sellers sequentially or simultaneously. A more complex experiment is an
online market situation that is similar to a stock exchange
and in which one seller may negotiate with multiple buyers
and one buyer – with multiple sellers.
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